As biometric authentication systems become common in everyday use, researchers are beginning to address privacy issues in biometric recognition. With the growing use of mobile devices, it is important to develop approaches that support remote mobile verification. This paper outlines the need for a mobile/remote SVM-based authentication system that does not compromise the privacy of the subject be ing recognized. We discuss limitations of earlier privacy preserving authentication systems and present necessary privacy and security requirements that make a system at tractive from both the server's security point of view and from the client's privacy-centric point of view. We then present a novel protocol we call "Vaulted Verification" that allows a server to remotely authenticate a client's biometric in a privacy preserving way. We conclude with a small eval uation of performance, discussion of security implications, and ideas for future work.
Introduction
The underlying question addressed in this paper is "Can we have a secure, privacy-preserving means of remote vision based verification using support vector machines?" The an swer, of course, is yes. This paper presents a novel approach to privacy-enhanced verification. We aim to solve the im portant problem of improving recognition rates by allowing SVM-based models while at the same time allowing remote verification to improve privacy and provide secure verifica tion of the match. While the core algorithm can be applied to other recognition problems, this paper will focus on face based biometric verification. This paper lies at the intersec tion of four areas of vision-related research: support vec tor machines for recognition, remote and mobile authenti cation, face recognition, and privacy enhanced recognition. The problem that motivates our research is the ability to perform remote verification. Suppose a client, say Chris (C), wishes to use a mobile phone or laptop to remotely au-169 thenticate to a central server, say a bank (B). Both parties require the system to be secure and Chris wishes to main tain his privacy. With classical solutions, Chris enrolls and the bank maintains a central database with his biometric template and biographic data. When Chris wants to access his bank account, he provides his biometric and biographic data for verification, and the bank separately matches these items. This may seem secure for the bank, but Chris has privacy and security concerns about the server storing his enrollment record, receiving his raw biometric data, and be ing able to match on his raw data whenever desired. How can Chris ensure the data sent for verification is not being phished? How can Chris ensure no one uses his recognition data without his consent?
One solution to this privacy/security conundrum is to use privacy-enhanced template protection(PETP). Earlier tech niques such as cancelable biometrics [21] and fuzzy vaults [12] have been explored but have significant security prob lems [23, 18] . Some PETP techniques such as revocable biotokens [4] and fuzzy conunitment schemes [13] are still secure but are not suitable for remote matching. I Other approaches from the domain of data mining in volve multiplying feature vectors by a random orthogonal matrix to "rotationally perturb" each vector [6] . Unfortu nately, attacks based on Independent Component Analysis can compromise those methods' security [10, 17] . A simi lar method that discards information is called "random pro jection," [3, 17] originally intended for dimensionality re duction but recently applied to privacy-preserving biomet ric systems [24, 14, 9, 2, 11] . These random-projection ori ented approaches provide some protection but they have se curity limitations and weak performance.
Because the client values privacy, ideally the server should never have access to biometrically identifiable data; not at enrollment, not at matching, and definitely not stored on the server. However, new problems arise if the server no longer controls the matching. With a traditional biometric system or with traditional privacy-enhanced technologies, there is no way for the server to verify the remote match. Thus, an important goal of this paper is to develop a method that supports secure remote matching.
In the field of non-privacy-preserving face recognition, using multi-view galleries for training is now a widely accepted technique to improve performance. Many state of the art systems use SVM classifiers, e.g. [20, 15] . This raises an interesting question: How can we combine mul tiple views and use general SVM classifiers in a privacy preserving setting?
To meet these goals, we show how to build a privacy preserving SVM-based verification system. With our sys tem, a server can use an SVM classifier to verify a client's authenticity by stepping through a challenge-response pro tocol. This is done in such a way that the server cannot learn anything about the client from the trained SVM tem plate. Furthermore, classification can only commence with the client's cooperation, making "automatic" classification impossible. These two properties help preserve the client's privacy. To show our method's feasibility, we implement a remote face authentication system.
Privacy and security requirements
What does it mean for a classification method to be "pri vate"? For our purposes, we define a "private" verifica tion system as one that is resistant to the following attacks [23, 7, 8] :
• Man-in-the-middle or replay attacks: During authenti cation, eavesdroppers/attackers must not be able to cap ture any useful information, nor should they obtain infor mation that describes the subject's biometric.
• Record multiplicity attacks: Templates of the same subject across multiple databases must not be linkable.
• Compromised template attacks: If an attacker acquires the template on the server, they must not be able to learn anything unique about the subject's biometric, and they must not be able to authenticate as the subject.
• Automated identification attacks: Classification must only be possible with the subject's consent. Verification without the subject's knowledge (e.g. in an automatic terrorist-identification system) must be impossible.
• Blended substitution attacks: A malicious insider (with all server keys) must not be able to silently replace the subject's template with one that matches the subject and the attacker. Doing so would allow the attacker to "back door" the authentication system. [23] 170
• Non-revocability concerns:
The classifier template should be "revocable"; the subject should be able to destroy the template simply by destroying a passphrase used in the authentication process.
Finally, all these requirements should be achievable without a large drop in verification accuracy.
Our SVM-based verification system is novel because it protects against the six attacks outlined above while still providing useful accuracy for many verification problems. To our knowledge, no other SVM-based system exists that satisfies these requirements.
Previous work in private SVMs
There is little research exploring privacy-preserving SVM classification. Certain methods exist, but they only focus on protecting the training set, not the final classifier.
Two methods exist for allowing multiple clients with dif ferent shards of the training set to construct an SVM clas sifier without revealing their portion of the set to the other participants [25, 26] . Neither method addresses protecting the SVM itself after training; the final classifier is assumed to be securely stored by a trusted third party.
Another method describes a way of post-processing a trained SVM to protect privacy of the support vectors [16] , but this approach only works on Gaussian kernels because it discards terms of the Gaussian function. In a sense, the final SVM produced by this method trades privacy for accuracy. The final SVM may still leak information about what types of vectors it classifies.
All three methods focused on problems such as medical classifiers where the goal was to release the final classifier while still protecting the privacy of individual patients' sup port vectors. The final SVM was left slightly altered [16] or unprotected [25, 26] . If an attacker acquired a copy of the SVM classifier, they could acquire the support vectors that store the subject's identification and could feasibly recon struct the subject's biometric. Thus, these schemes are un suitable for our problem. Ideally, we wish to build an SVM matching system that can classify samples without reveal ing anything about the samples it classifies. matches the template against the probe? How is the tem plate stored? In a traditional protocol, if the server matches the client's biometric against a stored template, it is the server's responsibility to keep the template and the match ing data secret. Further, if an eavesdropper captures the bio metric or the stored template, they can compromise the pri vacy of the subject. On the other hand, if the client matches the biometric against the template, the server must trust the client's response because the match score alone has no in herent security value. In such a protocol, the server has no way of double-checking the client's match claim.
This creates a conflict. For security, the server must match the biometric because it cannot trust the client. For privacy, the client must match the biometric because if the server gets the raw data, it could compromise the client's privacy.
SVM Vaulted Verification Protocol
To satisfy the privacy requirements outlined in Section 2, we present a full authentication protocol that allows a server to use SVM classifiers to authenticate a client in a privacy preserving way. This is presented for secure face verifica tion but should be useful for other modalities/domains.
Our SVM vaulted verification scheme preserves privacy by having the client perform the SVM classification. This way, each classifier can be encrypted by the client's key; hidden from the server. To avoid placing trust on the client's authentication decisions, the server uses the classifiers to build the challenge, and the client must prove to the server that it actually has the feature vector being classified. Thus, only the client can decode or use the SVM classifiers, and only the client can test the feature vector. The server's role is to generate a token that the client can only derive from the proper SVM classifiers and the proper feature vector.
One way of generating such a token is to force the client to distinguish between "real" and "chaff" SVM classifiers, storing both kinds in the template. Each bit of the server's challenge-response token could contain one real and one chaff classifier. The client uses each classifier to classify the corresponding part of the feature vector and decides which classifier is real and which is chaff. The client's decision then becomes that bit of the response. This is the core of how vaulted verification works: storing multiple real and chaff SVM classifiers in the template and forcing the client to decide between the two at authentication time.
Because an attacker does not know the difference be tween the real and chaff SVMs, it cannot construct the re sponse with better than random chance. Further, because each classifier is encrypted with a key that only the client knows, each template conceals the client's privacy from the server. This way, no identifiable information is stored on the client, and the data stored on the server cannot be decoded without the client's encryption key which never leaves the client's device.
Our protocol makes two important assumptions. First, we assume that a classifier can be chosen such that an hon est subject can distinguish between the real and the chaff but an impostor cannot. Second, we assume that each feature vector can be split into meaningful parts such that each part is individually distinguishable from its corresponding chaff part. Both assumptions impose restrictions which could de grade performance. Other than that, this approach makes no real assumptions about features or classifiers -like fuzzy vaults, our approach is a very general concept.
The rest of this paper is devoted to a detailed description of the privacy-preserving SVM vaulted verification proto col at enrollment and match time. We then describe some security considerations and outline its implementation in a face authentication system, concluding with an evaluation of the performance and security of our system. Throughout the description of our protocol, we assume that all commu nication between the client and the server takes place under a trusted channel such as SSL with hard coded certificates.
Enrollment time
At enrollment, the client generates a feature vector, FV, that represents the user. This feature vector is then permuted (shuffled) according to a "permutation key," Kp, derived from the client's passphrase and/or secret key stored on the device to yield P FV. This permuted feature vector is then split into N smaller vectors, 81, 82, ... , 8N. Each "slice" of 8 has -b as many elements as PFV. Using 8, N one class SVM classifiers, VI, V2, ... , V N, are trained. Because SVM classifiers generally require more than one sample in the training set, the same process can be repeated on mul tiple feature vectors of the subject, all permuted with Kp, to yield several 8i suitable for training classifier Vi. This allows a multi-view gallery to be used.
In addition to V, the client uses the same process to generate different but statistically indistinguishable "chaff" SVM classifiers WI, W2, ... , WN trained on corresponding "chaff" feature vectors. Ideally, these chaff feature vectors should be chosen such that the subject can tell which clas sifiers are elements of V and which classifiers are elements of w, but attackers will find them indistinguishable.
At this point, the client has N classifiers (v) trained on parts of real feature vectors from the client and N corre sponding chaff classifiers (w) trained on the corresponding parts of chaff feature vectors.
The client then generates a polynomial, f, with C < N random coefficients and a corresponding chaff polynomial g with C random coefficients. Even though f is never stored, it plays an integral part of the match process, used as both an authentication token and a means for error correction.
For each element Vi of v, the client creates the triple ( Vi, a, f (a)) for some random number a. In a sense, this triple binds the serialized representation of classifier Vi to a random point on the polynomial. The client then creates the corresponding triple (Wi, b, g(b)), which binds the chaff classifier Wi to a point on the completely different, mean ingless polynomial g. Each triple is then encrypted with an encryption function E with key Ke. Only the client knows Ke so only the client can recover the elements of each triple.
At this point, the template contains hash(f) and N pairs of encrypted blocks:
The client takes one last step before storing the template. If the template were stored as shown above, the server and attackers could know that Vi would always be the first ele ment of each pair. To avoid this, the client defines a "canon ical swapping," CS = {O,l} N , derived from the coeffi cients of f. For each bit in CS (call it CSi), if CSi = 1 then the ith pair is swapped in the template -the real be comes the second element and the chaff becomes the first. This way, the real and chaff are stored unpredictably.
Finally, the client encrypts the template with the server's public key, storing the final template on the client's device. This prevents an attacker from using the template if they steal it from the client and makes the server a less interesting target (see our security discussion in Section 5.3). To ensure that the client presents the correct template, the server stores only a hash of the encrypted final template.
After enrollment, what kind of information does each party have? From the client's perspective, this template con tains a large block of data encrypted with the server's key. In order to authenticate, the client must send the template to the server who decrypts it before starting the rest of the protocol, discussed below. Because the client never has the "raw template" until after a successful authentication, an attacker cannot gain any useful information by stealing the template from the client.
From the server's perspective, once the client sends the template, the server can see that the template contains hash(f) along with N pairs of encrypted triples; half of which encapsulate V and half of which encapsulate w. Be cause the server does not have Ke, it can never recover or alter the triples and thus it cannot obtain v. Further, as suming hash(f) is one-way, the server cannot obtain the coefficients of f. These properties preserve the privacy of the client from the server and from any attackers that gain access to the classifier template.
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Match time
5.2.1
Overall principle
During match time, the client first sends the encrypted tem plate to the server. The server then generates an authenti cation token. In order to ensure that only the subject can recover this token, the server encodes this token as a unique transformation of the template and sends the transformed template back to the client, challenging the client to detect the transformation and extract the authentication token. How can this transformation occur? Recall that the en roller encrypted each SVM with the client's key. The server clearly cannot change the content of the template, but it can change the template's structure by swapping the pairs of triples stored inside. This way, the server can consider each pair of triples as a single bit of a binary string of length N. The server can then encode this binary string by sending the template back with some pairs swapped. For each bit, if the server sends (Ei(vi, ai, !(ai)), Ei(Wi, bi, g(bi))), a binary 0 is assumed.
If the server instead sends (Ei(Wi, bi, g(bi)), Ei(vi, ai, !(ai))), a binary 1 is as sumed. Because the client can distinguish between V and w, the client knows which triple came first; thus, the true client can extract each bit of the string sent by the server. The client can then use this string to prove it actually had the biometric. Because an attacker cannot distinguish be tween v and w, they only have random chance of correctly guessing each bit.
Detailed protocol: Server's role
The server uses the steps outlined in Algorithm 1 to authen ticate a client. To authenticate a client, the server receives the encrypted template from the client, compares its hash with the stored hash to ensure the client presented the cor rect one, and decodes it. The server then thinks of a random bitstring B = {O, I} N and a random nonce. B and nonce are only valid for this session.
The client's ultimate goal is to return
where II denotes concatenation. To do this, the client must extract the bits in B along with the coefficients of! through the matching process.
Detailed protocol: Client's role
At authentication time, the client captures a probe feature vector, FV', permutes it with Kp, and splits it into N parts, P I , P 2 , ... , P N · Each element of P should be correctly classified by each corresponding classifier v stored on the server because at enrollment, Vi was trained with samples similar to Pi. The client decrypts m using session key Ks and saves the nonce. For each pair in m sent by the server, the client decrypts both triplets with Ke; call these triplets (ti' ai, l' (ai)) and (Ui, bi, g' (bi) ). Either ti = Vi and Ui = Wi or Ui = Vi and ti = Wi. The client must decide which is which by classifying each Pi with both ti and Ui. For example, assume the classifier with the better classifica tion score is Vi and the other one is the chaff classifier. The client could then retrieve the corresponding bit of Bi and assume that either (ai, l' (ai)) or (bi, g ' (bi)) (depending on its choice) denotes a point on polynomial 1. 1 is over-determined because it has only C coefficients but the server sends N encoded points on the polynomial. This provides a sort of backwards error correction. If the client is unable to extract the required C points on 1, it can perform a weighted search (such as that further described in Section 5.2.4) to find the correct polynomial.
Using this backwards error correction scheme, the client can obtain all the coefficients of 1 along with the bitstring response B'. Because of the canonical swapping, B' i-B, but once the client has the coefficients of 1, it can derive the CS used for enrollment. For each bit ofCS, B = CS(f)B' The client can then send its response.
Searching the polynomial search space
The client must successfully extract all N bits of the bit string to authenticate. To do this, he or she must correctly identify C bits and use the polynomial to recover the rest. This creates a problem: how does the client know which bits it guessed correctly?
In the detailed description of the protocol given above, we describe a naive example in which the client decides each bit based on the assumption that Vi always yields a 173 higher classification score on Pi than Wi. This assumption often does not hold. Thus, the client will have to search for the polynomial, using a backwards error correction ap proach wherein the SVM marginal distance provides a com putational advantage over an adversary.
The weighted brute-force search works as follows: the server sends several pairs of triplets, call them (ti' ai, l' (ai)) and (Ui, bi, g ' (bi)). As usual, the prob lem is to find the coefficients of 1 by deciding which of ti and Ui corresponds to V and which corresponds to w. To do this, the client sorts the pairs by "confidence," defined as the difference in classification scores, in descending or der. Then, the client can take the C pairs with the highest confidence and discard the rest. The client can first try to construct 1 using the C most confident points. If this poly nomial does not match the rest of the points in one element of each pair in the template, the client can try all possibil ities of matches assuming one flipped bit. If no match is found, the client can try more possibilities with probabili ties being driven by the SVM marginal distances. To verify any particular guess, the client can simply construct I' from the C pairs and find whether or not one element of the rest of the pairs lies on 1'. If all pairs contain a point on 1', the client knows that 1 = 1'. This search strategy assumes that the client correctly guessed all but a small number of the least "confident" bits. To find the correct polynomial, the client must step through up to different possibilities, where W is the number of incor rect bits in the original guess. This scheme gives a large ad vantage to the honest subject who can correctly guess most of the bits and search the rest in order of likely errors. With a good chaff generation scheme (see Section 6.1.2), an at tacker should get about half of the bits wrong due to random chance, and has no advantage in choosing what bits to flip while searching.
Security considerations
How does this SVM verification scheme satisfy the privacy requirements in 2? This model has many layers of security that work together to provide a private system. First, the raw template is encrypted against the server key. The server only stores a hash of the template, mak ing it an uninteresting target and deterring attackers. To decode the template, an attacker needs both the server's pri vate key and access to the template stored on the client's de vice. Each block is individually encrypted with the client's private key, further preventing the attacker from recovering the raw classifiers. Even if an attacker decrypts V and w, the "canonical swapping" of each pair prevents the attacker from discerning between the real and the chaff without the coefficients of f, which would allow them to authenticate anyway. These properties prevent the server and attack ers from acquiring the client's biometric data, preventing a compromised template attack.
Because the server cannot easily modify or decode the template in encrypted form, blended substitution and au tomated verification attacks are computationally infeasible. Also, because Ke and hash(J) are assumed to be unique to each enrollment, record multiplicity attacks are impossible and the client can revoke their biometric template by simply forgetting Ke. During the authentication process, the only unique infor mation exchanged between sessions is the server's nonce, the ordering of the encrypted template pairs, the hash of f's coefficients, and the hashed client response. None of these leak information about which pairs are which, so man-in the-middle or eavesdropping attacks are fruitless, even as suming an attacker could subvert the SSL communication between client and server. To guess B with no a-priori knowledge and without Ke, the attacker would have one chance per authentication challenge to correctly guess all N bits along with all coefficients of f and would have no way of verifying their answer. Even if the attacker knew Ke, he would have to possess a biometric which eventually matched against v for at least C bits. If he obtains a similar biometric that correctly yields less than C bits, his search space would be greatly reduced depending on the degree of the biometric's similarity. If the attacker additionally wishes to compromise the client's privacy by obtaining a picture of the client's face, he would also have to obtain the permutation key Kp and then somehow derive a picture of the face from the reassembled feature vector. It is unknown if the SVM data could support image recovery.
Implementation in an SVM-Based Face Verification System
To test the merit of our SVM classification scheme, we im plemented an SVM-based face verification system. The honest subject enrolls with face images and can then au thenticate by presenting his/her face.
Implementation Details
GRAB Feature Vectorization
For every classification, we must convert images into fea ture vectors. We chose the GRAB descriptor as it has been shown to yield good accuracy on multi-class recognition problems in the FERET and LFW datasets [22] . GRAB feature vectorization works by transforming the image into a "processed" version of the image by using a method simi lar to linear binary patterns [22, 1] . The final feature vector is the concatenation of the histograms of each subwindow in the processed image. The goal here is not to show this is the optimal face-verification approach, but rather to validate the 174 vaulted verification design and understand the impact of the vaulted-verification challenge-response model on the origi nal SVM's accuracy. During matching and enrollment, the feature vectors are permuted according to Kp and split into N parts for SVM training. In this scheme, permuting the feature vector has the effect of "spreading" the important discriminatory infor mation about areas near the eyes, mouth, etc. across mul tiple SVM classifiers inside the template, thus improving overall accuracy. For these experiments, we use one-class RBF SVMs as implemented by libsvm [5] .
6.1.2
Chaff generation
A good chaff generation scheme is an important part of our protocol. If w is "too close" to v, the subject may have a hard time discerning them. On the other hand, if w is "too far" from v, an attacker might be able to gain access since many faces might be closer to v than w.
In our face verification system, we trained w on random parts of feature vectors of other people. This required a change to the experimental protocol: At the beginning of our test, we took 64 subjects from the dataset and removed them from the rest of the experiment. Each image from these subjects was processed using the same permutation Kp and used to train 64 x N SVM classifiers to yield several "canonical negative examples" El ... E64. Each element of w was the corresponding slice of one example from E, cho sen randomly. Practically, using a limited set of "negative examples" makes the chaff easier for an attacker to guess if they gain access to the pool of examples used, so a much larger pool should be used in practice.
To evaluate these ways of generating chaff, we ran exper iments using the evaluation protocol in Section 6.2.l. No searching was done and no polynomial was used to correct incorrect bits. The purpose of this evaluation was to identify the distribution of scores for this chaff generation scheme. Figure 1 describes the subject's advantage over the attack ers in discerning each real SVM from the chaff in terms of the distribution of how many bits the subject correctly guessed versus how many bits the attacker correctly found. Note this presumes ground-truth knowledge but highlights the advantage for the true subject.
Evaluation
6.2.1
Experimental Protocol
Because our experiments depend on machine learning clas sifiers that require three or four images to train each sub ject, we could not use the standard FERET protocol because each subject may have only a single gallery sample. Instead, we chose the FERET240 set, a subset of FERET [19] that contains the subjects that have at least four images [22] . While FERET240 has been used for identification testing, we adapt it for verification testing in the following manner. We choose 64 subjects to be the "chaff generators". Three pictures of a subject were chosen for their gallery and their remaining images were positive-labeled probes. All images for the other 175 subjects were impostor images.
To establish a baseline, we ran the experiment as de scribed above with a single SVM classifier classifying a GRAB feature vector. The original GRAB algorithm com bined the 64 regions' features, but here we classify each separately. To improve privacy we not only use the 64 re gions of the original grab, but we also include a random per mutation of the features before training the 64 classifiers.
Results
For the first baseline -a single one-class classifier trained on raw GRAB feature vectors -we achieved 57.2% TAR at 0.0107% FAR. The split-region version with N = 64 classifiers trained on parts of the feature vector, is our pri mary baseline. SVMs don't lend themselves well to vary ing security/convenience type analysis, but with a multiple classifier model we can easily vary the number of match ing bits. At 56 bits matching, the baseline performance was .08%FAR and 69.5%TAR. For higher convenience settings, the baseline at 48 bits provided a FAR of 6.89% at a TAR of 90.15%. Note the split region baseline is considerably weaker than the baseline set by a "vanilla" face verification system, so there is an inherent loss in simply combining counting "bits" compared to the power of an SVM combin ing the regions.
Note that using only 3 images for training is minimal for a I-class SVM approach. As a personal verification system, we expect many many more images, which would signifi cantly improve TAR performance at a fixed FAR. However, our goal here is understanding the valuated verification per formance impact and using existing datasets will improve scientific reproducibility. Future work will test with more appropriate datasets, including liveness detection.
The rest of our tests used the protocol described in Section 6.2.1 with the "random negative example" chaff scheme and the polynomial search described above, end ing the backward error correction search after 1024 steps. We tested vaulted verification with various numbers of re quired matched bits (C), and varied the number of error cor rection steps as a means of varying the FAR. To measure our performance relative to the split baseline, we create a "Privacy/security impact graph" which shows the percent improvement/loss over the baseline TAR with respect to a given FAR, as shown in 2. This graph shows the relative gains and losses that our privacy protection has at various FAR, plotting 100 * v i/ where V if the TAR of Vaulted Verification at the given FAR, and B is the TAR of the base line algorithm at that FAR. We can see that at larger FAR rates, vaulted verification shows slightly decreased perfor mance, and at lower FAR (higher security), vaulted verifi cation actually improved performance.
Our most secure vaulted verification test required 55 bits to match to find f. While this test significantly improved performance over the split baseline, the TAR is likely too low to be feasible, though with more training images it may become viable. Our least secure vaulted verification test only required 35 bits, but under-performed the base line achieving an FAR of 4.20% at a TAR of 77.5%. This fell well below the split baseline, underscoring the impor tance of choosing sensible parameters when implementing Vaulted Verification.
Security considerations
Keep in mind that these impostor trials only tested the bio metric's ability to resist a stolen template attack. We es sentially presume the attacker has both the server and the client's encryption keys/passwords, testing only the biomet ric performance of our algorithm separately from its secu rity. For these tests, we assumed the attacker somehow ac quired Ke, and Kp, which requires physical access to the client's device and the client's passphrase. If the attacker could get this far, they could likely find an image of the client's face, thus compromising the biometric. If the at tacker did not know Ke and Kp, there would be no false accepts because guessing f and B is statistically infeasible; see Section 5.3.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper discussed the need to create privacy-preserving remote SVM verification systems. To achieve this, we devised new biometric-based challenge-response protocol that allows the client to perform the matching while prov ing its authenticity to the server. We implemented our SVM Vaulted Verification protocol in an SVM-based face recognition system. We presented preliminary results that demonstrate this protocol's feasibility for face verification and we outlined several possible ideas for improvement.
In the real world, more than 64 bits of security are de sired. Thus, one objective of future experiments will be to evaluate our privacy-preserving SVM verification protocol at higher N and multiple C.
Future work will also involve improving accuracy and applying this research beyond face matching, extending it to other domains such as voice, keystroke, and iris verification. It will also address the very important aspect of liveness detection, ensuring the system cannot verify against a static image.
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